
UNCLASSIFIED

TELCON SG Waldheim/Kissinger 8:40 a.m. - 10/29/75



K: Hello.

W: Yeh, good morning, Henry.

K: Good. I am sorry I couldn't get back to you last night.

W: That's all right. Don't worry. Henry, I just wanted to tell you what my impressions are on the Sahara. The emotions in Morocco are going very high and involves some difficulties to discuss quietly the situation. The emotions are so high there including the King himself. He wants to continue the march and only if Spain agrees to cede the Sahara to him and to Mauritania, he is ready to step up the march.


Now the reaction by President Boumedienne is serious. I never saw him so furious and rather uncontrolled than on that occasion. I had several meetings with him and he was always very much controlled.

K: He's always very controlled.

W: He wants to do that and that means fire in the area. I'm definitely not ready to tolerate this. He made a quick reference to the resistance of Polisario (sp.?), but he said this is not the worst. If it comes to such a solution then it will have repercussions not only on the neighboring states but those on the Middle East. He asked me to tell you that he cannot tolerate such a development. In other words, he means between Morocco and Spain and he asked me to convey to you his request that you make a suggestion to the Moroccans to stop the march and to start reasonable negotiations on the basis of existing resolutions; in other words, a self-examination for the people of the Sahara. But I want to stress that the mood of Boumedienne is very serious and he seems to be decided to do whatever is in his means to block any solution worked out between Spain and the Moroccans.

I then had, in Madrid, extensive talks with the Prime Minister. It seems to be that the Prime Minister is more ______ than the Foreign Minister. But we discussed a compromise solution inasmuch as I suggested that they should work out a plan that Spain is making a declaration to restore everything in two or three months. That then to establish an interim administration of let's say, six months or so and during this interim administration Moroccans, Mauritanians and representatives of the population of the Spanish Sahara could participate already in that interim administration to work out the conditions of the referendum or consultations -- of course a referendum will be difficult with there.

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K: What do you suggest we do?

W: Sorry?

K: How do you suggest we proceed?

W: I think that certainly, Henry, it is important to send a message to the King to stop that march because the real danger is that if he is crossing the border that the real resistance is not by the Spaniards. The Spaniards. I think, are not so ready to fight. They don't want a colonial war, but the whole area is full of mines. The Spanish government has told me this. Also the mines are marked by the Spaniards. It is easy to see that there could be an incident and this would create some serious problem. And then, of course, Ricarios (?) by a shooting incident, guerilla warfare, supported by etc. I must repeat, however, I was that much impressed by the extremely tough and rather emotional way in which Boumedienne reacted. He said if it comes to such a solution, this is the beginning of a fire in the whole area and I shall not fail to do whatever I can to fight against such a solution. So I was quite impressed because normally, you know, he is always rather quiet, but he was extremely tough and rather emotional. Complaining bitterly, not only about King Hassan saying it is the end of our relations but also about President Ould Daddah calling him a hypocrite. I said, well I try to defend Ould Daddah saying my impression was that he was a little embarrassed, that he would rather prefer a solution which maintains the friendship with . He said, "Oh no, he is a hypocrite." He could help in talking the King out of this whole thing but he doesn't do it, he is just going along and supporting him. He is extremely bitter and I'm afraid he will react in one way and the other. He didn't elaborate.



- K: Who did he say was a hypocrite?
- W: (Apparently the Secretary General did not hear the question.) He could not tolerate this and that he would have to react. And he asked me repeatedly to convey this position to you asking you to help in avoiding such a bilateral deal with Spain because it would have consequences, not only for the region directly concerned but also for the neighboring regions and he mentions the Middle East especially.
- K: OK, well, I'll keep that very much in mind. And I'll let you know what we plan to do.
- W: Yeh. I just wanted to -- I wish to repeat that I consider the situation very serious. If you could perhaps ______ or if you think that I could talk to Sisco this morning, he's coming for the lunch that I'm giving for President Sadat.
- K: Yeh, I will tell them to talk to you.
- W: Sorry.
- K: I will urge one of them to call on you.
- W: Yeh. Because I could then give you more in regard to this compromise plan which I have just mentioned and which could perhaps be a way out of the dilemma. For your information, after having been in Madrid I then sent one of my closest colaborators, the Frenchman, I sent him to the King. He was received by the King yesterday afternoon and he sent me a cable saying that he got the impression that although the King did not immediately agree to this compromise he was giving not a positive answer but he thought that there is a possibility to do something about it and he will fly on to Boumedienne this morning to see how he reacts finally and if there is anything new I'll let you know.
- K: OK. And I'll send Sisco or Atherton to see you.
- W: Yeh, I would appreciate that because I could give them all the details especially in regard to this compromise idea.
- K: I'll do it immediately. OK, thank you.
- W: Goodbye.
- K: Goodbye.